9-1 The first stage of the evacuation operation
As noted before, the Imperial General Headquarters decided to evacuate from Kiska Island. However, as a result of the Allied occupation of Attu Island, Kiska Island was sealed off by Allied aircraft, patrol ships, and submarines. In addition, US fleets occasionally cruised around Kiska Island and bombarded the island from ships. Allied vessels were equipped with SG radars, which allowed them to fire shots through fog.
The Imperial General Headquarters believed that the main battle fields would be in the southeastern Pacific. In fact, on June 30, the Allied Forces invaded on Rendova Island in the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific and Salamoa in New Guinea. It was thought that when the fog season ended in the Aleutians, the Allies would naturally invade Kiska Island. The construction of defensive positions on Kiska Island was more advanced than that on Attu Island. However, the ammunition stored on Kiska Island for battle was only enough for one week, and food would last until the end of July even if saved [4, p603]. If the Allies invaded Kiska Island, it would be inevitable that the garrison on Kiska Island would suffer the same fate as on Attu Island.
The Japanese had to rescue about 5,600 soldiers on Kiska Island by all means. The Combined Fleet ordered the Fifth Fleet to secretly begin the Operation "Ke-gou", the evacuation operation from Kiska Island, on May 29. The name of this operation was the same as that of the evacuation operation from Guadalcanal Island in February 1943. The operation was to be evacuated the troops from Kiska Island mainly using submarines, although destroyers and small ships would be used depending on the situation [4, p565]. However, it was thought that it would take until the end of September to evacuate all the people by that way. Moreover, given the situations of the Allied blockade, it was considered that it would have been better if only half of the soldiers could be evacuated [3, p468].
The purpose of this operation kept secret from the soldiers. However, the naval forces on Kiska Island immediately guessed the evacuation from the island because the name of the operation was the same as the evacuation from Guadalcanal Island. However, the Army North Sea Garrison learned of the purpose of the operation only after the Staff returned to Kiska Island from Paramushir on 9 June. As for communication on the evacuation operation, a strict information control was conducted to prevent the Allied forces from being aware of it, and the use of ordinary codes was forbidden. The Northern Unit had begun evacuating wounded and sick soldiers and military personnel from Kiska Island using submarines on May 27 before the operation was launched. Thirteen submarines participated in this operation. By June 9, the Japanese submarines had made six successful evacuations from the island. Although the number of people removed at any one time was only at 60 to 80 people, the submarine-based evacuations appeared to be proceeding smoothly.
In fact, at this time, the US fleets had returned to their naval bases to resupply, as the operation on Attu Island had come to a close. Around June 10, however, the US forces reestablished a blockade around Kiska Island. Between June 10 and 12, the Japanese submarines "I-169" and "I-21" were suddenly bombarded in thick fog, but no damage was sustained. However, as mentioned before, the submarine "I-24" disappeared on June 11, and the submarine "I-9" on June 14. According to the US military records, the "I-9" was detected by radar at a distance of 6.4 km, and subsequently attacked and sunk after her periscope was sighted [24, p37]. On 17 June, the submarine "I-2" was hit by a shell, but was successfully evacuated because the hit location was off the lethal part [4, p583]. The Operation "Ke-gou" was temporarily suspended due to these damages.
The Operation "Ke-gou" resumed on June 18 with four submarines. The submarine "I-7" which first approached Kiska Island on June 21, was bombarded using radar in the fog from the destroyer "Monaghan" just before entering Gertrude Cove of Kiska Island. The shells hit the bridge of the "I-7" and the commander and captain were killed in action, rendering the submarine inoperable. The submarine was stranded at the cape for emergency repairs. The submarine completed emergency repairs by the help of the 51th Base Force the next day, and was heading for Yokosuka on the sea in a thick fog. But she was again engaged in a gun battle with the destroyer. The submarine attempted to return to Kiska Island but was flooded by the damages and stranded on a nearby reef [4, p580]. Eighty of the submarine's crew were killed in the battle. The submarine "I-7" was carrying a code book, and the submarine was later blown up by the 51st Base Force on Kiska Island. As a result, the Operation "Ke-gou" was ordered to be temporarily ceased on June 23. In the end, by June 18, 872 people, mostly military personnel and wounded, had been successfully evacuated from Kiska Island by submarine [4, p574].
9-2 The first act of the second stage of the evacuation operation
9-2-1 Operation plan
As a Pacific High begins to strengthen in June and July, moist southerly winds blow around the Aleutian Islands when the low-pressure system passes over the Bering Sea. Those moist southerly winds often cause fog around the Aleutian Islands when they touch the still-cold ocean surface. In fog, Japanese ships were able to avoid air attacks.
The Combined Fleet wanted to quickly finish the Operation "Ke-gou" and to concentrate all its forces in the southeastern or central Pacific, the main battlefield. Therefore, since early June, the Combined Fleet Command had been studying the use of fog. The Fifth Fleet began to plan to evacuate in one go by surface vessels using fog. The Fifth Fleet assigned this mission to the First Torpedo Squadron.
Major General Tomokazu Mori, the commander of First Torpedo Squadron, fell ill, and Major General Masatomi Kimura assumed the commander of the squadron on June 11. He had no experience in the Navy General Staff which was a naval career path. However, he was a mild-mannered and decisive man with a wealth of experience in actual combats in various operations in the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific. He was presented with two plans for evacuating from the Fifth Fleet: one was to conduct the operation with all of his destroyers (11 ships), and the other was to use a special cruiser. The one using destroyers would be rapid but would not be able to accommodate all of the soldiers in Kiska Island. The one using a special cruiser could accommodate all the soldiers, but it was likely to be found by the Allies because the ship was a reformed merchant ship with slow speed [4, p606]. If a battle occurred during the operation and the destroyers were damaged by 50%, it was thought that subsequent evacuation operations would be difficult [3, p474]. After much consideration, it was decided to use light cruisers capable of high speed instead of special cruiser. The Army questioned why not use heavy cruisers. However, the Commander Kimura was of the opinion that it would be more convenient not to use heavy cruisers, which consumed large amounts of fuel and required escort by destroyers [3, p475].
On June 24, the Northern Unit ordered the First Torpedo Squadron to begin the Operation "Ke-gou" to [4, p606], and on June 28, the structure of evacuation fleet was decided. For this mission, an accommodation detachment, an escort detachment, and a supply detachment were organized. The accommodating detachment consisted of the light cruisers "Kiso" and "Abukuma", and the destroyers "Hibiki", "Yugumo", "Kazakumo", "Akigumo", "Asagumo", and "Usukumo". The escort detachment consisted of the destroyers "Shimakaze", "Samidare", "Naganami", "Wakaba", and "Hatsushimo". The supply detachment consisted of the oil tanker "Nippon-Maru" and the naval defense vessel "Kunashiri", and the special cruiser "Awata-Maru" was assigned as a reserve detachment [4, p607]. Depending on the situation, it was planned that the garrison would be accommodated in the escort and reserve detachments as well. In addition, 11 submarines and patrol boats participated in reconnaissance, patrols, and weather reporting. However, most of them issued weather reports had never returned.
To avoid the enemy's knowledge of this evacuation operation, the use of general codes in communications was prohibited and the use of special naval codes was prescribed [4, p608]. In order to ensure rapid taking the soldiers on board and in case of naval engagements, the Navy requested the Army to not carry rifles when the solders went on board. This was the unusual request, as the soldiers carried rifles even during the retreat from Guadalcanal Island [3, p477]. In addition, to disguise the ships as US cruisers, one of the light cruisers' three smokestacks was painted white to make it look like US two smokestack cruisers in fog [4, p614]. Other some innovations were made in the route for entering the berth, the loading of additional landing crafts to shorten the housing time, and the selection of the return route. On top of that, since the light cruisers "Abukuma" and "Kiso" lacked effective anti-aircraft weapons, the Army's 7 cm field anti-aircraft guns were tentatively installed on the decks [4, p614].
This operation had the contradictory aspect of utilizing fog - they would be able to avoid to be detected by the enemy in fog, while at the same time a fog impeded the fleet's navigation. Therefore, Ensign Kyoichi Hashimoto, a meteorological officer, was assigned to the squadron [4, p614]. However, he was a graduate of the Department of Geophysics at Kyushu University and was not an expert in meteorology. He would be killed later in action on Saipan Island. The light cruisers "Abukuma" and "Kiso" were equipped with Imperial Navy Type 2 Class 1 radars, but they could only be used for lookout purposes, not for range measurements for firing [19, p315]. At the request of Commander Kimura, the newly built destroyer "Shimakaze" equipped with the latest Imperial Navy Type 2 Class 2 radar capable of range measurement was assigned to the squadron on July 1 [4, p614]. However, the operation of the radar did not seem to be stable at that time. It was not until the summer of 1944 that the radar operation stabilized after radar receivers employed a super heterodyne system. On the other hand, all ships were equipped with passive radar detectors for ultra-short waves [4, p614], but it was highly likely that they would not respond to the US SG radar employed microwaves [15, p97-98]. In addition, it was also equipped with reflectors for radar deception [24, p41].
The only clue to navigating in fog was the beacon signal emanating from Kiska Island. There was a small island before entering Kiska Bay, and it was not known whether the fleet could reliably avoid it in fog and reach Kiska Bay safely. Also, the start time for the garrison to embark on ships in Kiska Bay was set at 1500. However, the garrisons scattered in Kiska Island had to be on guard until the last minute, and in some places it took several hours to reach Kiska Bay, the embarkation point. To ensure a speedy pickup, the departing time for Kiska Bay was set according to the guarded points.
9-2-2 Fog forecast for the operation
In order to make this operation a success, fog forecasts for the Kiska Island area were required for at least three days ahead of evacuation. The heavy responsibility for forecasting the fog fell to the 22-year-old Fifth Fleet Weather Chief, Navy Ensign Kazuo Takenaga, a graduate of the meteorological engineering school of Central Observatory. He had been ordered to investigate fog forecasts in April. For this weather forecast, he first needed weather observation data in the high latitudes of the North Pacific. He used the results of past North Pacific weather observations made by ships and North Pacific weather charts published by the Marine Meteorological Observatory in Kobe, Japan, to research fog forecasting [25, p7]. He also asked vessels anchored at Paramushir about the characteristics of fog in the Aleutian Islands.
Even with the meteorological data available, he had to develop new forecasting methods to produce fog forecasts. The rules he painstakingly compiled for forecasting sea fog over the western Aleutians were as follows [26, p6].
- When the Northern Kuril Islands become foggy, there is a 90% or greater probability that fog will occur near Kiska Island two days later.
- Fog occurs when a low-pressure system approaches, and the fog clears after its passage.
- Fog is most likely to occur when the wind speed is 5 to 7 m/s. When the wind is light, there is little fog.
- Fog is more likely to occur when the water temperature is at least 2°C higher than the air temperature.
- The fog season on Kiska Island is from late June to early July, with fog decreasing in the latter half of July.
The first rule was called "plus-2-theory". Considering the consistency of 4. with the southerly winds at the time of approaching low pressure in 2., it seems more appropriate to assume that "the water temperature is more than 2°C lower than the air temperature (the air temperature is more than 2°C higher than the water temperature)" in the summer season. However, fog could occur under either condition.
9-2-3 Progress of the operation
The Fifth Fleet forecasted that fog around Kiska Island would become thicker in the evening of July 10, fog or drizzle on July 11, and less fog on July 12. Based on this forecast, the First Torpedo Squadron with the accommodation and the escort and the supply detachments departed from Paramushir on July 7, setting July 11 as the evacuation date at Kiska Island. However, the First Torpedo Squadron predicted on the way that a high-pressure system would develop on July 11, and the fog would dissipate. So they postponed the evacuation date to July 13 while waiting in the area en-route. In fact, on July 11, the weather near Kiska Island was cloudy, but visibility was 10 to 15 km, and in the evening an US destroyers bombarded Kiska Island. Since Kiska Island was not sufficiently informed of the postponement of the operation, the troops on the island happened the confusion that they sent luminous signals and guided radio transmissions toward the US fleet. [7, p336].
The First Torpedo Squadron predicted that the weather on July 13 would be foggy in the afternoon. However, if the low-pressure system moved slowly than expected, the fog would develop later in the evening. The Squadron postponed the evacuation from Kiska Island to July 14 because they considered that the US fleet seemed to be on high alert in addition to the weather conditions. The First Torpedo Squadron's weather judgment at this time differed from those of the Fifth Fleet Headquarters and the 51st Base Force, and was generally very cautious [4, p617]. The sea area where the First Torpedo Squadron was waiting was clear all day, which might make the squadron's advance to Kiska psychologically difficult too.
On July 13, the 51st Base Force forecast predicted rain or fog on July 14, and it would recover on the evening of July 15. However, the First Torpedo Squadron predicted light fog and good visibility on July 14, as high pressure near the squadron was moving directly toward the Kiska Island area. The squadron postponed its evacuation to July 15 to avoid air attacks and turned around and headed south [4, p617]. At 2100 on July 13, however, as a low-pressure system was moving eastward behind the high-pressure system, the First Torpedo Squadron's forecast changed to "bad weather on July 14 (for convenience for evacuation)" and the evacuation date was back to July 14 [4, p618]. However, at 0125 on July 14, the evacuation date was changed again to July 15, because the high waves were expected by the low-pressure system to make the soldiers difficult on board. In fact, the weather around Kiska Island was bad on July 14, and the US fleet was navigating just east of the island [3, p483]. At 1450 on July 14, the First Torpedo Squadron turned north toward Kiska Island in heavy fog [4, p618], aiming to evacuate on July 15.
However, the low-pressure system passed near Kiska Island earlier than expected, and by 0300 on July 15, it was cloudy, but visibility had recovered to about 10 km. At 0600, the weather condition near the First Torpedo Squadron was clear, with visibility of 20 to 30 km [4, p619]. The scheduled arrival at Kiska Island was at 1500, but the weather conditions at Kiska Island were expected to improve further. Already they were within patrol range of US aircraft, it was impossible to return and wait again due to lack of fuel. At 0905 on 15 July, the First Torpedo Squadron abandoned the operation [4, p619]. The Combined Fleet command sent the request to Fifth Fleet at 1521 to continue the operation, but the First Torpedo Squadron had already headed to Paramushir [19, p318].
As mentioned above, the weather forecasts at the First Torpedo Squadron changed three or four times, and each time the fleet repeated turning northward and turning southward. Meanwhile, the troops in the 51st Base Force on Kiska Island destroyed or abandoned all but the bare minimum of weapons, ammunition, and food, and they assembled on the beach for evacuation every day from the June 11 to 15, which took several hours depending on troop deployment. The failure of the first act in the second stage of the evacuation operation had a serious impact on soldiers, and they were prepared to be wiped out. The Japanese Official War History, Senshi Sosho "Navy Operations in the Northeastern" supposes, "the garrison of Kiska Island must have felt more disappointed than criticizing the actions of the First Torpedo Squadron.” [4, p626].
9-3 The second act of the second stage of the evacuation operation
9-3-1 After the failure of first act of the evacuation operation
The Fifth Fleet's cancellation of the evacuation operation caused strong dissatisfaction among the Combined Fleet Command. On July 20, the Vice Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Kengo Kobayashi, was dispatched to the Fifth Fleet command in order to monitor the operation [4, p627]. The Fifth Fleet Command, which considered some damage unavoidable when evacuating from Kiska Island, also condemned the First Torpedo Squadron's cautious actions [4, p628]. On the other hand, the First Torpedo Squadron took their prudent actions for granted, since the loss of so many destroyers would seriously affect future operations. The condemnation by the Fifth Fleet command was frustrating to them [4, p630-631]. The Fifth Fleet and the First Torpedo Squadron differed in their positions and thinking. Therefore, it was decided that the Fifth Fleet Command on the light cruiser "Tama" would accompany the First Torpedo Squadron next time, and the Fifth Fleet Command would directly make the go or no go decision off Kiska Island [4, p631]. After the go decision, the light cruiser "Tama" carrying the Fifth Fleet Command was supposed to return to Paramushir without going into Kiska Island. The special cruiser "Awata-Maru" was also excluded from the evacuation fleet due to her slow speed.
The end of July was approaching. It was believed that fog was not expected to appear in August. Also, Paramushir had only enough fuel left for one round trip to Kiska Island for fleet operations. The fog seemed not to generate easily. The center of the Pacific High, normally located near 30°N, was near 42°N that year, making fog unlikely to appear [26, p65]. Chief Meteorologist Takenaga was reprimanded even for the cause of the no fog, and he became neurotic. Commander Kimura seemed firmly determined in his heart to succeed the next time. However, he spent his time fishing in the harbor, seemingly oblivious to the pressure from those around him.
Weather map for July 23, 1943. The Pacific High pressure was biased northward off Tohoku from usual. Source: Weather map of Japan Meteorological Agency, Edit: Digital Typhoon, National Institute of Informatics
9-3-2 The beginning of the second act of the evacuation operation
On July 22, a low pressure developed over the Sea of Okhotsk, resulting in fog around Paramushir. The "plus-2-theory" indicated that fog was expected to develop in the Aleutian Islands around July 25. The second act of the evacuation operation was initiated, with the evacuation date on July 26. On the evening of July 22, the First Torpedo Squadron, consisting of three cruisers, eleven destroyers, and supply ships departed Paramushir with the Fifth Fleet Command on the light cruiser “Tama”. On the July 23, the First Torpedo Squadron predicted the weather for the July 26 to be cloudy and foggy with good visibility, so proposed to the Fifth Fleet Command to postpone the evacuation to be on July 27. However, the Fifth Fleet command did not approve of this and did not change the evacuation on July 26 [4, p633]. However, this low pressure advanced faster than expected. On July 24, the low pressure passed over Kiska Island, and then it was getting cleared around Kiska Island.
Meanwhile, the fleet sailed in dense fog for several days, and on July 23, the oil tanker "Nippon Maru" and the sea defense vessel "Kunashiri" of the supply detachment were missing from the fleet. Furthermore, on July 24, the formation of the fleet was disrupted by fog. Therefore, at 0704, the Fifth Fleet Command of the light cruiser "Tama" approved the postponement of the evacuation date to July 27 [4, p633]. At 1500 on this day, "Kiso" test-fired a temporarily equipped army field anti-aircraft gun in the fog. Then, the "Nippon Maru" happened to hear this sound and was able to join the fleet [4, p634]. If the "Nippon Maru" had not been able to supply fuel oil during this operation, the fleet would have been unable to continue the operation. However, "Kunashiri" was still missing.
At 2000 hours on July 25, the radar detector of the fleet detected an enemy submarine, so the fleet was evacuated. This detection might have been due to the US submarine's an ultra-shortwave SD radar for anti-aircraft [27, p229]. Due to this evacuation action, the date of the evacuation from Kiska Island was changed to July 28 or 29 [4, p634]. The First Torpedo Squadron predicted that the weather around Kiska Island would worsen after July 28 [4, p635].
There was a difference in thinking between the Fifth Fleet Command and the First Torpedo Squadron regarding the evacuation action from the submarine detected late of this day. The First Torpedo Squadron believed that it had sufficient time to move south to get away from the submarines and then move north in time for the evacuation date. However, the Fifth Fleet Command's instruction was to stay (round movement) in the vicinity in order to be ready for heading Kiska Island at any time. The First Torpedo Squadron was not satisfied with the instruction to remain in the vicinity to the submarine, but complied [4, p636].
The fleet was navigating in a single column except for the straggler "Kunashiri" due to thick fog. However, at 1744 on July 26, "Kunashiri" suddenly appeared near the fleet out of the fog and collided with the middle of starboard of the light cruiser "Abukuma". This disrupted the formation, and the destroyer "Hatsushimo" came into contact with the destroyers "Wakaba" and "Naganami" [4, p636]. Due to this damage, the maximum speed of "Wakaba" and "Hatsushimo" was reduced to 12 knots. As a result, "Wakaba" returned to Paramushir by herself, while "Hatsushimo" change her role to escort "Kunashiri" [4, p64]. The commander of the 21st Destroyer Squadron, who had been sitting on the destroyer "Wakaba", was transferred to "Shimakaze".
With the exception on July 24, Kiska Island had been under clear weather, and the Allied aircraft and fleet activities were active. The 51st Base Force on Kiska Island was concerned that the fog season was over. However, they were eager for arriving the evacuation fleet to Kiska Island [4, p640], as there was no chance to evacuate if this opportunity was missed. On July 27, a low-pressure system developed in the Sea of Okhotsk and Paramushir became foggy. At 0600 on July 27, the First Torpedo Squadron predicted the weather on July 29 around Kiska Island to be foggy from the “plus-two theory”. However, the Fifth Fleet Command forecasted that it would be light fog and enemy aircraft could fly [4, p640]. As described later, on the night of July 27, the US fleet bombarded a phantom target detected by radar in the seas south of Kiska Island. The lights from this bombardment were observed from Kiska Island, and soldiers assumed that fleets were engaged. However, in the Japanese fleet, since there were no corresponding ships, it was judged to be a friendly fire between enemy fleets [4, p639].
On July 28, Kiska Island became foggy from early morning as a low-pressure system that developed yesterday in the Sea of Okhotsk approached the island. Fortunately, the fog cleared near the fleet for 30 minutes from 1010, allowing the fleet to confirm the position by celestial observation and to set up the formation. The First Torpedo Squadron predicted that the weather on July 29 would be "cloudy with westerly winds and sometimes foggy”. The Fifth Fleet predicted that the fog would be light, but with visibility of 4 km, it would be somewhat difficult for enemy aircraft to fly. The Fifth Fleet command of the light cruiser “Tama” was unsure whether or not to proceed to Kiska Island [4, p642]. In the first act of the second stage of the evacuation operation, Fifth Fleet Command criticized the actions of the First Torpedo Squadron, but when it became involved on the spot, it was not as it had thought on the desk. Lost in thought, Commander-in-Chief Rear Admiral Shiro Kawase on board "Tama" sought the opinion of the aggressive Colonel Shigenori Kami, the captain of "Tama". His opinion was that "if we were to slog along, we will miss the chance for evacuation", which prompted the Commander-in-Chief to decide to head for Kiska Island [4, p642]. At 1600 the fleet changed its course for Kiska Island. As night fell, the fog was denser, and the fleet was convinced that the operation would be a success.
9-3-3 Evacuation from Kiska Island
On July 29, the weather on Kiska Island was optimal with fog and visibility of about 1,500 m, making it difficult for the Allies to detect the fleet. At 0700, the light cruiser "Tama", with the Fifth Fleet Command aboard, broke off from the First Torpedo Squadron and headed for Paramushir as scheduled. The First Torpedo Squadron was planned to arrive at Kiska at 1430 for the convenience of the evacuation soldiers. However, the Fifth Fleet Command sent a signal to Kiska Island at 0855 to move up the arrival time by four hours. The reason for this was unknown. The signal was predetermined in "one letter," and the Allies could not estimate the direction or position of the ship even if they received it [7, p400]. Accordingly, the First Torpedo Squadron rescheduled their fleet to arrive at Kiska Bay at 1330 with speed up at 0900 [4, p644]. The First Torpedo Squadron, which was traveling clockwise around the north side of Kiska Island, had to avoid nearby reefs and other obstacles, but the fog made it impossible to determine its exact position. At about 1130, the fog lifted momentarily, and Kiska Fuji was visible, which allowed the fleet to confirm their exact position. Once around the east side of Kiska Island, a beacon transmitted from Kiska Island allowed the fleet to enter Kiska Bay smoothly [7, p404].
On that day, the radar in Kiska Island caught enemy aircraft overhead in the morning, and by about 0900, anti-aircraft shots were fired two times. However, the enemy aircraft returned, probably because the fog was denser around 1000. Also in the morning, the sound of an enemy destroyer patrolling near Kiska Island was captured, but it seemed to have gone somewhere as well [7, p358]. At 1150, before entering Kiska Bay, the First Torpedo Squadron received from Kiska Island a report on sound of enemy ships. In addition, the destroyer "Shimakaze" also detected a target on her radar, thus anticipating an encounter with enemy ships. At 1300, the "Abukuma" spotted the shadow of the ship and immediately launched four torpedoes. They hit and made explosion. However, what appeared to be the shadow of ship was a small island near the entrance of Kiska Bay [4, p644].
Soldiers on the island were suddenly informed on the morning of July 29 that the schedule (1500) had been moved up and the fleet would arrive around noon. The troops, who had several hours to reach Kiska Bay, left their breakfast, which they had just begun to eat, and rushed to the bay. The First Torpedo Squadron entered Kiska Bay successfully at 1340 [4, p644]. The area around Kiska Island was shrouded in a deep fog, but visibility in the bay was good. Accommodation of the soldiers aboard the ship was smoothly accomplished using the landing crafts (Daihatsu) that remained on the island and those had been loaded by the fleet. As mentioned earlier, soldiers were ordered to dump their rifles into the sea (some ships were allowed to keep them) to allow for taking quick on board. To facilitate the soldiers' transfer from Daihatsu to the ship's deck, special ladders were prepared, which were made of wood woven with rope, rather than rope ladders that were difficult to climb. As a result, all the officers and soldiers were accommodated on the ship within an hour. During the accommodation, there were occasional signals of enemy aircraft over the sky, so the radar unit remained until the end to watch for enemy aircraft. When part of the fleet began to leave port, the radar was blasted off, and the radar unit was taking on aboard the ship with the last Daihatsu [7, p360].
At about 1430, the evacuation was completed, and the fleet departed. However, at 1627, the "Abukuma" spotted an US surface submarine at a distance of only about 2 km on the way. The fleet was thought to have been discovered, but no radio transmission was made from this submarine, perhaps because it was misidentified as an US fleet [4, p646]. The fleet avoided it without attacking. This may have been the effect of painting one of the light cruisers' smokestacks white to make it look more like US cruisers. Also, on July 29, the Northern Unit sent false telegrams that the fleet was berthed at Ominato [19, p320].
The First Torpedo Squadron returned safely to Paramushir between July 31 and August 1. Thus, The Operation "Ke-gou" was completed with a success, with 5,186 men safely removed from Kiska Island. Chief Meteorologist Takenaga, who conducted weather forecasting aboard the heavy cruiser “Nachi” in Paramushir during this operation, was thanked for his work by everyone. Their attitudes were a complete change from what he had experienced before. In the Brief report of the operation, Kawase, Commander-in-Chief of the Fifth Fleet, stated "I was nothing but thrilled that this operation was able to take advantage of an opportunity where enemy aircraft activity was completely hampered by dense fog and enemy patrols were also inadequate, as it was entirely by the help of heaven and God." On August 31, Commander-in-Chief Koga of the Combined Fleet sent out a telegram to reward his efforts. On August 2, the Emperor, the Grand Marshal of Japan, gave his compliments on the operation [3, p 492].
9-3-4 The Phantom Sea Battle off Kiska Island
The success of the evacuation operation from Kiska Island had much to do with the actions of the US fleet, as Commander-in-Chief of Fifth Fleet noted "the enemy fleet's patrols were also incomplete." On July 24, the radar of a Catalina flying boat detected seven ships 150 km southwest of Attu Island [8, p91]. The North Pacific Forces judged these to be Japanese reinforcements and sent the fleet to the corresponding waters in order to intercept them, including two destroyers that had blockaded Kiska Island. Late in the evening of July 27, the battleships "Mississippi" observed a radar response in waters 150 km southwest of Kiska Island [2, p86]. The battle ships "Mississippi" and "New Mexico", the heavy cruisers "Wichita", "Louisville", and "Portland" immediately approached this target to 22 km and fired on the target, which was invisible even with flares, for about 30 minutes. At daybreak on the July 28, reconnaissance seaplanes were flown but failed to detect any wreckage or drifting debris [10, p93].
The fleet's radar officer later suggested that the radar response may have been caused by radio reflections from Amchitka Island, some 180 km away, due to abnormal atmospheric conditions [8, p91]. This battle is also referred to as "The Battle of the Pips". Around July 29, while the Japanese was evacuating Kiska Island, the US fleet was replenishing depleted shells and fuel 200 km southeast of Kiska Island, except the destroyer "Hull" [2, p88]. This created a gap in the US fleet's blockade only at this time, being opened a passage to and from Kiska Island for the Japanese fleet. Of course, the Americans were completely unaware that the Japanese had evacuated from Kiska Island using this momentary gap.
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